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Case :lo. 17268 
STATEME1~T OF NATURE OF CASE 
This case was initiated by the Plaintiff-Appellant 
seeking to enforce and validate as a contract for the sale of 
land a certain Earnest '.foney Agreement and Offer to Purchase. 
A Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance was entered by 
the Fourth Judicial District, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
presiding, on July 25, 1980. On appeal, the Plaintiff-Appellant 
does not, apparently, contest the correctness of any finding of 
fact of the Court below, but does challenge t:-ie propriety of the 
conclusions of law drawn therefrom and the propriety of the 
Decree of Specific Perforr.:.ance. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmation by this 
Honorable Court of the Decree and Judgment of the Court below, 
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As there is no dispute in this appeal that the findings 
of fact of the Court below were supported by the evidence and 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief on Appeal cites extensively from 
those findings, Defendant-Respondent shall limit this statement 
to those findings critical to the ultimate conclusions and 
Decree of the Court below, including findings not referred to by 
Plaintiff-Appellant and to the records where opposite to the 
issues on appeal. 
:he Court below in granting to Plaintiff-Appeallant 
specific performance of the contract, found that Defendant-
Respondents had waived the date of closing as stated in the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. The Court found 
that Plaintiff-Appellant notified Defendants-Respondents' real 
estate agent on or about Oct. 1, 1979, that he was ready to close. 
(See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings No. 's 7 
and 11.) ~he Court further found that the facts supported the 
C:ollowing ·:onclusions of Law: 
3. The contract had the effect of giving construct-
ive possession of the real property to the Plaintiff. 
~- The Defendants oerformed no affirmative acts 
whic::-, -,vould tenninate the constructive possession of 
Plaintiff. 
-2-
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While the Court below did find that the failure of 
this transaction, which included the exchange of real prooerty, 
was the "fault" of the Defendants-Respondents, no finding of 
fact or conclusion of law was entered that the breach was willful I 
The court below decreed the following i~ support of 
and in enforcement of the Judgment and Decree of Specific 
Performance of the contract of the parties to this action entered] 
on or about the 4th day of August, 1979: 
It is further decreed that the implementation of the 
Purchase Car.tract of August 4, 1979, shall be as follows: 
(a) The closing of the transaction shall occur not 
later than ten (10) days after final disposition of this lawsuic, 
including expiration of all appeal rights. 
(b) Payment shall be made by Plaintiff to Defendants 
of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) down paument referred to in 
the Earnest Honey Receipt and in paragraph 3 (d) of the Findings i 
I 
of Fact herein at the time of closing. There shall be no interes:: 
charged on the TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00). 
(c) One-half (1/2) of the interest on the principal 
less the TEN THOUSAl'lD DOLLARS ($10,000.00) referred to in 2(b) 
above of this Decree from the date of signing the Contract to t~ 
date of closing as set forth in 2(b) above should be waived and 
forgiven the Plaintiff. 
(d) After the date of closing as set forth in paragcaD:, 
2(b) above of this Decree, interest should be charged at the fuL I 
-3-
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rate of Ten Percent (10%) per annum, and all payments shall be 
made as provided in the Contract. 
1Jetween Plaintiff-Appe 1 1ant and 
his attorney occurred at trial: 
0 Mr. Blomquist, are you still ready, willing and 
able to close this transaction --
A Yes. 
Q -- in the event it should be ordered by the Court! 
A Yes. 
(T.R. at 80, 81) 
The uncontroverted facts at the trial were that 
Plaintiff-Appellant had not paid any taxes owed by the Defendant-
Appellant, nor had any payments under the contract, other than 
the $100.00 earnest money, been received or paid, including 
payments under the contract due to Defendants-Respondents' seller 
by Plaintiff-Appellant. (T. R. 90 and 92). The Plaintiff-Appellant 
paid none of the taxes on the subject property to be transferred 
under the contract to Plaintiff-Appellant on September 15, 1979, 
(T.R. 90 and 92). In regard to the payment of interest under 
the contract, the following colloquv occurred between the 
Plaintiff-Appellant and the Court: 
THE ;nT~ESS: Interest from September 15 through 
June 15. I'm assuming it will cake a few days to put 
everything back into order. 
THE COCRT: At what rate~ 
THE WIT:TESS: It's at 10 Fercent, I believe. 
THE COURT: At the contract rate! 
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THE WITNESS; Yes, And I'd be liable for that 
interest now if we went ahead with the contract the 
way it was set up. (T, R. at 89) 
ARGUMDIT 
POINT I. 
ENTRY OF A DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORXANCE AND THE 
BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES I:T 
PROVIDING THE TERMS OF SAID DECREE, ARE DISCRETIONARY 
WITH THE TRIAL COURT, AND SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED ON 
APPEAL WHERE NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAW. 
While the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 9, does 
provide that in appeals "in equity cases the appeal may on 
questions o:: law and facts" this court has made clear that it 
will review evidence in the light believed by the trial court 
and not from the perspective of the appealing party. Kier v. 
Condrack, 478, P.2d 327 (Utah 1970). While in the present case 
appellant does not challenge the findings of fact of the Court 
below, it is submitted that the appellant herein, in its brief 
on appeal, is interpreting the facts as found by the court in 
the light most favorable to that party, which is not necessaril:· 
what the court found to justify its ultimate conclusions of la•.; 
Furthermore, this court has expressed on issues 
identical to those challenged on appeal in this case. i.e. the 
trial court's authority to allow or refuse to allow interest to 
a vendor found in breach in a contract to sell land. thac the 
trial court must balance the equities, which necessa:cil:r entai: 5 
some discretion on the part of the lower court. Eliason v. 
Watts, 615 P. 2d 427, (Utah 1980). As stated in Eliason· 
-5-
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When specific performance is granted. it is the 
obligation of the courts to evaluate the equities of 
the parties and to formulate a remedy that seeks to 
place the parties in a position as similar as possible 
to that which tl-_e" -.;r;•;'._.:_ '- ,-- .• bee:-, in had the convey-
ance been according to the terms of the contract. 
POINT II. 
THE DECREE OF nm COURT BELOW' WHICH ADJUSTED THE 
EQUITIES BETllEEN THE PARTIES A...~D PLACED THEM IN THE 
POSSESSION THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN rn HAD THE CONVEYANCE 
BEEN TIMELY PERFORMED mmER THE CONTRACT' SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
It should be noted at the outset that the record does 
not support the contention of the Appellant that the contract 
between the parties in the present litigation was to be closed 
and the option exercised on or about October l, 1979. (Brief 
of Appellant at page 5). 
The date under the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase is a closing date of September 15, 1979, which the 
court below found waived by the Respondents herein. (See 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusion of Law No. 2). 
It is submitted that this distinction is of particular importance 
to the understanding of the actual Decree of the court below, 
and in the balance of the equities. 
In this case the Plaintiff-Appellant sought to affirm 
the contract, rather than to rescind for breach by Defendants-
?.espondents; therefore he is bound by the terms of that contract 
and cannot specifically enforce only those provisions to his 
oenefit. Farnswort'.1. ''· Jensen, 217 P.2d j76 (Utah 1950). 
Appellant relies upon the holding of this Court in 
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Amoss v. Bennion, 456 P.2d 172 (Utah 1969), in asserting that 
the trial court in entering of a decree of specific performanc, ! 
in favor of the purchaser may deny interest on the purchase 
price until the date of the entry of the Decree and postpone 
the date upon which down payments and installment payments are 
to be made, It is submitted that Amoss v. Bennion, supra, ~s 
not on point to the present facts. This Court's decision in 
Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980) should be decisive 
of the issues. wnile Eliason dealt specifically only with the 
issue of interest upon the purchase price and not with grantb; 
the purchaser entirely new periods of time for payments under 
the contract, as stated by this Court in Amoss v. Bennion, I.Si 
P. 2d at 174, "The two points are governed by similar principle: 
of law," 
In Eliason v. Watts, supra, the vendor rejected a 
tender of payment by the plaintiff pursuant to an earnest Jlone·· 
and offer to purchase. The plaintiff successfully obtained 2 
Decree of Specific Performance. This Court, in Eliason laid 
down the following principles concerning the purchaser's dut:i 
to pay interest on the purchase price from the date of perforr· 
ance under the contract: 
The standard for determining the proper compen-
sation to the parties was stated in Ellis v. ~ihelis, 
32 Cal. Rptr. 415, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 384 P.2d 7 (1963)-, 
as follows: 
The guiding principle with respect to the cal-
culation of the damages incident to the decree 
of specific performance is to relate the 
performance back to the date set in the contract. 
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l 
Timely performance of the contract would result 
in the purchaser receiving the rents and profits 
of the land but being denied the use of the 
purchase money, and a purchaser who seeks to 
recover rents and profits must permit an offset 
for his use of the purchase funds durincr the 
period that performance was delayed. I~ an 
early case this court held that a defendant in 
a situation like the one before us should be 
permitted to offset against the profits interest 
on the entire purchase price. (Heinlen v. Martin 
(1879) 53 Cal. 321, 343). This holding is the 
overwhelming weight of authority. (Citations 
omitted.) See also In re Bond & Mort~age Guarantee 
.C.0......, 271 A.D. 44, 62 N.Y.S.2d 685 (19 6), app. 
denied 296 N.Y. 824, 72 N.E. 2d 15; Bostwick v. 
Beach, 103 N.Y. 414, 9 N.E. 41 (1886). (Id at 
430) . 
(8) In the present case, defendant's refusal 
to convey the property was found to be "wrongful 
in that it was in contravention of the contract 
but it was not willful or malicious so as to 
entitle plaintiffs to punitive damages." The 
usual rule of credit for purchase money interest 
against rental value should therefore be followed 
in adjusting the equities between the parties based 
upon their position had there been a timely convey-
ance. (Id at 431). 
This Court further noted in Eliason that only when the 
vendor's breach is wrongful or willful in the sense of being more 
than a mere breach of the contract terms, should the vendor be 
denied any excess of interest over rents and profits. Nonethe-
less. in the present case, it is clear that not only did Plain-
tif:-Aopellanc have complete control over all money required to 
be oaid under the tenns of the contract to Defendant-Respondent 
during the pendancy of t~is litigation and prior thereto, but 
also had constructive possession of the premises to be purchased 
by the Plaintiff-Appellant under the contract. (See Conclusion 
of ~aw ::10. 3). This ri~ht to possession was not tenninated by 
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any affirmative action of the Defendants-Respondents (Concl·~'­
of Law No. 4). There can be no question in this case the 
Plaintiff-Appellant has had the use and enjoyment of the r.:one .. 
otherwise due under the contract and did n.ot approoriate it :: 
otherwise set it aside. See 71 Am.Jur. 22, Specific Perfon2.:c., 
Sec. 219. Furthermore, as shown in the statement of facts ·''I 
Plaintiff-Appellant failed to pay any oart of the taxes or t: 
Defendants-Respondents' seller, as required by the contract,· ..:·: 
is the subject matter of this litigation. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant has not appeale~ clair.:ing 
error in that the trial court should have awarded him rents 2:.: 
profits from the period of the date of performance to the er.::· I 
of the decree. The court below found that the Defendants-
Respondents were at fault, but there is no finding that this 
means other than merely breaching the contract, nor is there 
any finding that the Plaintiff-Appellant did not have the 
beneficial use of the property tc be conveyed to him under .. , 
contract or that the Plaintiff-Appellant did not receive re::', 
and profits from the 120 acres. The Plaintiff-Aopellant is ..J 
required under the contract to convev to the Defendant-Pesocr..' 
In cases in equitv, as well as in law, this Court will icidul:' 
considerable deference to the Trial Court's findings and wrc: 
the evidence is in dispute, will assume the trial judge be Ee·' 
that which is favor:3.ble to his findings. Tanner v. 2aadsStac·· ; 
612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1930). 
-9-
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The court below of course granted to Defendants-
Respondents only one-half of the interest due under the contract 
until the date of closing, minus the $10,000.00 due at the time 
of closing as defined in the Decree and which otherwise would 
have been due on Dec. 31, 1979. As stated in the Statement of 
Facts herein, the Plaintiff-Appellant testified under oath that 
he was ready, willing and able to perform under the contract 
immediately upon entry of the Decree of Specific Performance. 
(See T.R. at 80 and 81.) The Court certainly should have been 
allowed to rely upon Plaintiff-Appellant's own statement in 
balancing the equities and determining that performance should 
occur as stated in the contract. Indeed, where the purchaser, 
prior to bringing suit for specific performance, sets his own 
date for performing under the contract, and on that date fails 
to perform. he will be denied any relief in law or in equity. 
Nuttall v. Holman, 173 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1946). The Plaintiff-
Appellant has affirmed the contract. He should not be heard to 
complain to the terms thereof. 
POnTT III. 
THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT GOVERN WHERE 
THE BREACH BY THE VE:1DOR IS NOT WILLFUL 
As noted above, the trial court did not find that the 
breach by the Defendants-Respondents was willful or wrongful 
or that c!:1ev were otherwise t!:ian in the mere sense of having 
breached t!:ie contract. It is submitted that the Court below 
could not !:lave found the breac!:i willful as the record shows that 
the Plaint~:f-A~pellant did noc personally contact the Defendants-
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Respondents or communicate to them on or about Oct. 1, 1979, 
that he was ready 1 willing: and able to close. but only notif:ec 
their real estate agent. (~~~u~~g of Fact No. 11) 
In Farnsworth v. Jensen, 217 P. 2d 571 (Utah 1950) t~:: 
Court held that the purchasers who obtained specific performanc 0 , 
of a real estate contract remained liable for the full amount 
of interest as stated in the contract, and that the terms ~f 
the contract applied. This Court drew the critical distincticr. 
between paid interest required as damages and interest orderec 
to be paid by a court by reason of the terms of the contract 
between the parties. This Court quoted from 30 Am. Jur., Sec.: 
page 6, in regard to interest required under the contract, whic: 
states that interest "is as much an integral part of the debt'' 
the principal itself; and while it forms an element in comput::.: 
the amount of recovery, it does so in a way that a provision 
of the contract limiting liability, or any other contractual 
provision as to the amount involved in the contract does." 
In Farnsworth, Supra, this Court did require the 
purchaser obtaining specific performance to pav interest from 
the date performance was due or interest began to accrue undec 
the contract. As this Court stated in Farnsworth v. Jensen. , .. 
P.2d at 575-576: 
The provisions of the contract expresslv ?rovide 
for the oavment of six oercent interest oer annum on 
the unpaid.balance from. the date of the contract until 
paid. The respondents have consistently denied that 
they have repudiated the contract or their obligations 
thereunder and have repeatedly insisted that the 
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contract was in full force and effect over the entire 
period. If such is the case, then respondents must 
carry out the terms imposed on them, whether they are 
beneficial or detrimental. They adm.it the retention 
and use of the money after the due dates of payments 
and yet seek to avoid the payment of interest on the 
amount retained because appellant was dilatory in 
clearing title. 
Conceding that appellant was not permitted to for-
feit the contract for failure of respondents to perform 
because she was in default, we are of the opinion that 
her default did not alter or change the obligations 
placed on respondent to pay interest on the unpaid 
balance. The interest contracted for is payable to 
appellant for resoondents' use of the money. It must 
be paid at the agreed times unless there is some action 
on the part of appellant which legally excused respond-
ents from performing in accordance with the provisions 
of the agreement. We are unable to discover evidence 
in the record which would oermit a court to release the 
respondents from the terms.of the contract nade by 
them. 
While this court did distinguish Farnsworth in Amoss v. 
Bennion, 456 ?.2d 174, on the grounds that in Farnsworth, Supra 
the breach was not willful and the purchaser had possession of 
the property, it is submitted that Farnsworth v. Jensen is 
apposite in the instant case on the very grounds that the court 
below found ?laintiff-Appellant had constructive possession and 
the breach was not willful. There is simply nothing in the record 
to release the Plaintiff-Apoellant from the terms of the contract 
made by him. 
Indeed at least one court has held that where there 
are contract terms specifically providing for interest, and 
?resumably for the time payment of interest and principal, these 
terms apply, and the rules in equity have no application. As 
stated by the i-"!innesota Suorene Court in Lund v. Larson, 24 :i.r.r. 
-12-
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2d 827 (Minn. 1946); 
(4,5) Because interest is the creature of contract, 
..i..i.. would 32em ::o ~o:..:...:r/'o'· : ... 6 ---::., ~ - -i -·- ~ -,~- - 3.2t':1-~d 
rule is that, where a contract for the sale and 
purchase of real estate contains express provisions 
relating to the purchaser's liability for interest, 
those provisions determine not only whether interest 
shall be payable on the unpaid purchase orice, but 
also all matters relevant thereto, such as the rate of 
interest, whether installment :oavments shall bear 
interest, and when interest shall accrue and cease, 
even though the purchaser enters into possession of 
the purchased land under the contract. 
(6) Since there cannot be two conflicting rules 
operating at one and the same time to determine the 
rights of the parties under a contract with respect to 
the same subject matter, the rule is that where there 
is an express provision in a contract for the sale and 
purchase of real estate relating to the purchaser's 
liability for interest the provisions of the contract 
govern with respect to the matter, and the rule in 
equity under which an equitable obligation to pay 
interest is imposed upon the purchaser in order to 
adjust the rights and obligations of the parties has 
no application. The rule in equity will not override 
express contractual provisions relating to the same 
matter. Security S. & T. Co. v. Latta, 118 Or. 559, 
247 P.777; Barnett v. Cloyd's Executors, supra. i 
While Lund v. Larson, Supra, did not concern the siw:! 
of a defaulting vendor, it is submitted this rule does apoly 1.,·]e:I 
the vendor's breach is not willful. Eliason v. \fat ts, Suora. 
The terms of the contract in the present case should 
be specifically enforced in the manner provided in the Decree ~: 
Judgment of Specific Performance of the court below. 
CONCLUSION 
There is nothing in the record to show that 
of the Defendants-Respondents was willful or wrongful. 
-13-
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the usual rules apply to allow the Defendants-Respondents interest 
on the purchase price which the Plaintiff-Appellant has had full 
use and enjoymenc chereo£. 
Furthermore, in light of the findings of the court 
below and Plaintiff-Appellant's own testimony as to being 
irrnnediately ready, ·..;illinf! anc1 able to close upon entry of the 
Decree, and in the balance of the equities, the Decree of the 
Court requiring payments of installments under the terms of the 
contract and requiring the Plaintiff-Appellant to pay one-half 
of the interest due under the contract to the date of closing is 
proper and should be upheld. 
DATED this day of 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAH OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS, P. C. 
By 
CERTIFICATE Or SERVICE 
I hereby certifv that a true and correct copv of the 
foregoing Brief of Pla1~tiff-Apoellant was hand delivered this 
_ / J l- day of ~ "'f(-"=CZZ , 1981. to: 
I LORI~l N. P~CT/ 
Attornev for Plaintiff-Aonellant 
431 South Third East, 3-l· 
Salt Lake City, CtM.'11 
-~-fL--P...L.-!.~"--1---~) ~11+----r--7Z~<1"'---'-----
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SALE OF CENTRAL MOHTANA LIVESTOCK 
COMPAllY . . . . . . . . . . . . 
POINT III LOST BUSrnESS OPPORTUNITIES Ul 
TRADING LIVESTOCK HJ MONTA.~A 
POI~JT IV TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
AWARD UITERVE!lOR DAl1AGES FOR LOST 
OPPORTU!l!TY OF INTERVENOR FOR 
TRADING TRAHSACTION AND PLAN IN 
TEE FUTURE'S COMMODITY !1ARKET . . 
POINT V TRIAL COURT ERRED nl FAILElG TO 
AWARD SUFFICIENT ATTOPJlEY' S FEES; 
ADDITUR P.EQIJESTE::J AND JUSTIFIED 
POINT VI TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES 
DUE 10 AllXIETY, EMBARRASSMENT, 
WORRY A:m COilCEPJl IS rnADEQUATE; 
ADDI TUR IS Rf.QUESTED A!ID JUSTIFIED. 
POINT VII THE TRIAL COVRT' S AWARD ON PUNITIVE 
DAllAGES IS I:lADEOUATE AND AN ADDITUR 
SHOULD BE ~iADE AiiD IS JUSTIFIED 
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